Every so often the government decides to create some mega-database that will contain all the information they need from citizens (or subjects, in our case). Viewing this optimistically, it is for the best of reasons – you’ll only need to update your information once and hence it will be more accurate, queries will be faster and you’ll start to miss the chance to send your passport in on each and every application form.
However, once pessimism (and a knowledge of history) kicks in, one has doubts – how will this information be used? What happens if a mistake is made? Can it be swiped? Who will have access? No country is short of scandals involving the theft and misuse of such information or the joys resulting from errors.
But there is an answer: public key cryptography. That may sound like gobbledegook, but it’s very simple, very useful and [hopefully] very secure.
Public key cryptography is based on each user having a private key, that remains accessible only to the owner and is further protected by a password or similar means, and a public key, which is disseminated far and wide. By finding the public key of a recipient, you can then use your private key to either sign (thus proving yourself as the source) or encrypt (and thus hide the document from all bar the recipient) a document for that recipient. This document can then be checked or decrypted by the recipient using their private key and your public key. This system is used for many online security systems, and for the famous PGP (and its open source cousin, GPG).
Say you have a download-able piece of software (via WebStart for instance). This is open-source, allowing third-parties to verify the contents (and build their own if they wish). You enter your details, and then select which agencies you wish to make them available to (say, the DWP or HMR&C) and what parts of your details you wish to make available (e.g. name and address to DWP, NI number to HMR&C). The software then uses your private key (on your local machine) to encrypt these data for the public key of the appropriate agencies, and uploads the encrypted files.
This approach leaves you in control of your data – you decide who sees it and what they see. The data in the government’s hands is encrypted – only you and the nominated agencies can read it.
Of course, this doesn’t deal with cross-agency interaction. One thought is that you remain the middleman – data is sent back to you and you may choose to make it available to the receiving agency. This leaves complete control in your hands, at the cost of having to review such transactions.
Further, we’re still stuck with human nature. People will loose their keys (via buying new computers, formatting their hard disc, or just plain silliness), forget their passwords and generally make life harder for themselves. Plus, given the reputed strength of the given encryption, this would wall off a lot of data from law enforcement agencies, and regardless of any other considerations this would be unlikely to find favour with our current authoritarian mob.
Still, it’s one approach to making something like this work for the populace, not against it.
